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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The

Trial

Court

and

the

Court

of

Appeals

both

refused

address the central and dispositive

issue in this case.

both Courts

an

which

did

focused
not

twenty-five

on and decided

have

year

old

to

be

addressed

Administrative

issue of
and
Policy

first

which
of

Instead,
impression

invalidated
the

to

Utah

a

State

Engineer.
The questions presented for review are:
1.

Is

it appropriate

for the Court

of Appeals

to decide a

question of first impression and thus overturn a long standing and
generally accepted Administrative Policy of the Utah State Engineer
when the answer to that question is unnecessary to the determination
of the case?

Does not justice require that courts of law address

2
and resolve the central and dispositive issues of the case before
seeking out and resolving questions of first impression that have no
real bearing on the outcome?
The specific

issues Appellant has pressed in both the Trial

Court and before the Court of Appeals are:
1.

Under

§73-1-11

U.C.A. 1953, does not water pass as an

appurtenance to land, unless reserved, after the State Engineer's
certificate of appropriation issues and it is stipulated that said
water was actually placed to use on the land so conveyed?

(This is

the question the Court of Appeals sidestepped and failed to address.
But, the answer to this question renders unnecessary the answer to
the question the Court of Appeals did address and did decide.

This

is so because Appellant received deeds conveying the land and all
appurtenances

before, and, after

the

State

Engineer

issued

the

certificate of appropriation.)
2.

Consistent with the policy of the Utah State Engineer to

transfer water as an appurtenance to the land under §73-1-11 U.C.A.
before a certificate of appropriation issues. Appellant also claims
to

have

received

land

and

appurtenant

water

Engineer's certificate of appropriation issued.

before

the

State

(This is the issue

the Court of Appeals unnecessarily decided.)
OPINION BELOW
Little v. Greene & Weed Investments, 141 Utah Adv. Rpts. 20
(C.A. 8/15/90) (see Addendum "A" for the text of the decision).

3
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Trial Court in a Decision
entered August 15f 1990.

A Petition for Rehearing was filed August

28, 1990. The Petition was denied September 5 r 1990.
n

B n .)

(See Addendum

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and §78-2a-4 (1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Section 73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953.
Appurtenant Waters - Use as Passing Under Conveyance. A
right to the use of water appurtenant to land shall pass
to the grantee of such land, andf in cases where such
right has been exercised in irrigating different parcels
of land at different times, such rights shall pass to the
grantee of any parcel of land on which such right was
exercised next preceding the time of the execution of any
conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases to
payment by the grantee in any such conveyance of all
amounts unpaid on any assessment then due under any such
right; provided, that any such right to the use of water,
or any part thereof, may be reserved by the grantor in any
such conveyance by making such reservation in express
terms in such conveyancer or it may be separately
conveyed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS
This action was brought in two Counts; Count I being an appeal
of a decision of the Utah State Engineer, and Count II being an
action to quiet title to a water right.

Because ownership of the

water right was considered determinative to the outcome of the State
Engineer appeal, the trial was bifurcated, with the quiet title
action being tried first.

The current proceedings involve only the

quiet title portion of these bifurcated proceedings.

4
Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided the case
on the proposition that a water right cannot pass as an appurtenance
to the transfer of land until a certificate of appropriation issues
from the Utah State Engineer.
5.)

(See attached Addendum "A", pp. 4 and

Not only is this holding contrary to a clearly established

policy

of

the

Utah

State Engineer,

but

it completely

fails to

address the second part of the Appellant's two-part argument.

That

is, even if water did not pass to Appellant as an appurtenance to
the

transfer

of

land

before

the

State

Engineer

issued

the

certificate of appropriationf Appellant nevertheless obtained a deed
immediately
acres

after

of the

the certificate

subject

land

and

so issued which

included

all appurtenances*

30.1

This second

transfer made it unnecessary for either the Trial Court or the Court
of Appeals to address the only question they did address and which
invalidated

a twenty-five

year old Administrative

Policy of the

State Engineer to transfer title to water rights as an appurtenance
to land before a certificate issues.

Both the Trial Court and the

Court of Appeals refused to address this part of Appellant's case,
although it was clearly and specifically raised in both proceedings
(Appellant's

Brief,

pp.

28-30;

Reply

Brief,

pp.

18-20f 116).

Moreoverf this question it is the sole focus of Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing.
The facts are undisputed.
1.

They are:

On December 19, 1967, Lester F. Little, Appellant's father,

was the owner of a water right for use on a specifically described
83.3 acres of land (Finding of Fact 9, Pre-Trial Order 111(b)).
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2.

On December 19f 1967f Lester F. Little submitted proof of

appropriation on said water right

(FF l f PI. Ex. 41).

"Proof" is

a sworn statement by the appropriator of water and his or her proof
engineer

that

the

appropriation

facilities have been constructed

is

completer

the

diversion

(wells, pipelines, etc.) and the

water has actually been placed to use.

It includes, maps f profiles

and drawings prepared by the engineer locating the completed water
works, place of use, etc. (§73-3-16 U.C.A. 1953).
statutory

step

appropriation.
certificate

required

of

Thereafter,

of

an
the

appropriation

if

appropriator
State
it

to

Engineer

is made

It is the last

to

complete

the

simply

issues

appear

that

a

the

appropriation has been completed in accordance with the application.
In

this

particular

case

the

State

pressing

problems,

(Tr.

50,

51)

Engineer,
did

not

because

actually

of
issue

other
the

certificate until October 21, 1969, approximately two years later.
And, because

of a descriptive

error, the certificate was amended

November 25, 1969 (PTO 111(d), FF 14).
3.

The deed constituting the root title in the file maintained

for the subject water right in the State Engineer's files is a deed
dated January 16, 1968 (PI. Ex. No. 6 ) .

This deed transferred the

land and all appurtenances one month after proof of appropriation
was filed by Appellant's father but
the State Engineer

approximately 20 months before

issued the certificate of appropriation.

deed did not reserve the water and included all appurtenances.
deed

was

from Appellant's

father to his five children,

Appellant, in undivided interests.

Said
The

including

6
4.

The Trial Court found that the subject water rightf as a

matter of law, could not have passed as an appurtenance to the
transfer of land on January 16, 1968 because the State Engineer's
certificate of appropriation had not issued on the water right. The
Trial Court thus allowed extrinsic evidence to interpret the terms
of what are otherwise two ambiguous quit claim deeds by which the
Appellee claims it received the subject water.

The Trial Court then

found that these two quit claim deeds transferred the water right to
Lorna and Clara (two of Appellant's sisters) on November 17, 1969.
(See FF 15 and attached

Opinion p. 5.)

These deeds constitute

Appellee's root title.
5.

On

October

21,

1969,

the

State

Engineer

certificate of appropriation on the subject water right.

issued

a

Because of

a description error the certificate was amended November 25, 1969.
6.

On December 30 and 31, 1969f the five children, including

Lorna, Clara and Appellant/ who owned the land upon which the water
was being placed to use, joined with each other as grantors and
conveyed the land to themselves individually.

For example, all five

children joined in conveying 30.1 acres to Appellant Larry Little
(PI. Ex. D-4) and 41.3 acres to Lorna and Clara (PI. Ex. D-5).

None

of the deeds reserved water and it is stipulated that water was
actually being placed to use on the acreage so conveyed

(Tr. 42;

Order Amending FF 1) .
7.

At trial, the

second

conveyance

in Appellee's chain of

title was an assignment dated September 1, 1972
192) .

(PTO IV(2) ; Tr.

7
ARGUMENT
I
JUSTICE DEMANDS THAT A COURT OF LAW ADDRESS AND RESOLVE
THE CENTRAL AND DISPOSITIVE ISSUES OF THE CASE BEFORE
ADDRESSING AND RESOLVING QUESTIONS OF FIRST IMPRESSION
WHICH HAVE NO REAL BEARING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE
Justice
principles

requires

of

law

to

that
the

a

court

facts

of

of

the

law

apply

case.

established

But, that

cannot

possibly occur where, as here, both the Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals

unquestionably

sidestep

and

thus

avoid

addressing

the

central and dispositive issue of this case.
It is well established Utah law that a deed in statutory form
conveys whatever right the grantor has to the water appurtenant to
the land, unless the water is expressly reserved.

Cortella v. Salt

Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 72 P.2d 630 (Utah 1937); Anderson v. Hamson,
5 Utah

151, 167 P.2d

254

(Utah 1917).

The

§73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 could not be more clear.

applicable

statute,

It provides, "A right

to the use of water appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of
such land" unless expressly reserved.
Here, both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided
that water, as a matter of law, could not pass as an appurtenance to
land until the State Engineer issues a certificate of appropriation
on the subject water right.
that

as

(See attached Opinion pp. 4 and 5 ) . Be

it may, both Courts

undisputed

contention

that

then
he

refused

to address

nevertheless

Appellant's

received

a

deed

transferring the land and appurtenant water after the State Engineer
certificate

issued

(PI. Ex. D-4)

-

thus

rendering

the

Court's

8
decision

on

determination

when

water

becomes

of the case.

appurtenant

irrelevant

The conveyance Appellant

to

the

relies on

occurred December 30, 1969 and, as a matter of law, had to have
included appurtenant water because the State Engineer certificate
issued on the subject water right October 21, 1969 and reissued
November 25 f 1969; it was stipulated that the water was actually
placed to use on the 30.1 acres conveyed to Appellant immediately
preceding the conveyance of land (Tr. 42; Order Amending FF 1); the
warranty deed included all appurtenances and did not reserve the
water (PI. Ex. D-4) ; and the grantors and grantees to the transfer
of land upon which the water was placed to use testified that that
was how they passed and received their interest in the subject water
right (Tr. John Little 97, 100; Lorna Little Cottam Tr. 127 f 136;
and Larry Lester Little Tr. 161) .

(The grantors and grantees were

the samef they simply conveyed the land and all appurtenances which
they held in undivided interests to themselves individually.)

Thus,

it is simply wrong for both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
to avoid and fail to address the legal effect of this conveyance.
There

is

simply

no

testimony

or

evidence

presented

that

even

suggests that the December 30, 1969 conveyance was not meant to
include appurtenant water*

It is all the more improper for both

courts

conveyance

to

sidestep

this

because

this

issue

was

specifically raised in every proceeding before both lower courts,
including

it being

the

sole

focus of Appellant's

Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals.

Petition

for

Moreover, the December 30,

9
1969 conveyance rendered unnecessary the decisions of both Courts on
when water becomes appurtenant to the land because under the Court
of

Appeals1

reasoning

Appellant

nevertheless

received

a deed

of

conveyance after the water unquestionably became appurtenant to the
land.
There is no dispute in the facts.

On January 16 , 1968, the

land upon which the water was being placed to use was conveyed in
undivided

interests to the children of the grantors.

no certificate of appropriation had issued.
the Trial Court determined

At that time

On November 19 f 1969,

that the subject water right passed to

Lorna and Clara, two of the children who by virtue of the January
16f 1968 conveyance also held the land in undivided interests.
State Engineer

issued

The

his certificate of appropriation on October

21, 1969 and because of a descriptive error amended and reissued it
November

25, 1969.

Thus, on November

25, 1969, Lorna and Clara'

unquestionably owned the land and the water right - under anyone's
theory.

All parties have stipulated

was actually placed

to use on the land Lorna and Clara co-owned

during the 1969 irrigation season
of Fact

1) .

Thusr

that the subject water right

under

the

(Tr. 42; Order Amending Findings

rationale

adopted

by the Court

of

Appeals, the water could have, as of November 19, 1969 or certainly
no

later

than

appropriation

November

reissuedr

25r

passed

1969
as

an

when

the

certificate

appurtenance

to

the

of
land.

Thusr when Lorna and Clara thereafter joined their two brothers and
one

sister

without

in conveying

reserving

and dividing

the land between

the water the subject water

themselves

right passed as an

10
appurtenance to the transfer of land under statutory authority of
§73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953.

By separate warranty deeds dated December 30,

1969 they conveyed 8 acres to one brother (PI. Ex. D-3) and 30 acres
to Appellant Larry Little (PI. Ex. D-4) . On December 31f 1969, they
conveyed 41.3 acres to themselves (PI. Ex. D-5).
all appurtenances.

None reserved the water.

All deeds included

Criticallyf the only

testimony of Lorna and Clara was to the effect that this conveyance
- the December

31 f 1969 conveyance - was how they thought they

received their water (Tr. 127f 136) - not by virtue of the November
19, 1969 quit claim deeds as asserted by Appellee and as found by
the Trial Court.
record.

These conveyances are undisputed and a matter of

No contention has ever been made that these deeds were

ambiguous.

And, they clearly conveyed the land upon which the water

was being used and to which it was then unquestionably appurtenant.
Thus, the water passed to the grantees of these deeds as a matter of
law and under statutory authority of 73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953.
no evidence to the contrary.

There is

And, it places the water squarely

within the chain of title asserted by Appellant and outside the
chain of title of Appellee.

It also demands, as a matter of law,

reversal of the Trial Court and renders unnecessary the decision
reached by the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether water is
appurtenant to land before the State Engineer issues his certificate
of appropriation.
Critically/ neither the Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals
addressed this part of Appellantfs case.

Moreover, the Appellees

11
did not address

it in their answer brief on appeal or at trial.

Yet, Appellant has raised it at each stage of these proceedings and
carefully preserved it for appeal and has set it forth in all briefs
(see Appellant's

Brief pp. 28-30, and

Reply Brief pp. 18-20, and

Petition for Reconsideration) and in argument.
The

issue

which

the

Court

of

Appeals

and

overlooked can be decided as a matter of law.
a matter

of

law, had

December

30

and

contrary

and

31,

the

appurtenances.

to have passed
1969

deeds

because
of

the

Trial

The subject water, as

as an appurtenance

there

conveyance

Court

is

no

evidence

clearly

to land
to

included

the
all

Under §73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 there can be no other

conclusion.
II
THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY DISRUPT AND INVALIDATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
OF THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER WHICH HAS BEEN UNIFORMLY ACCEPTED
AND APPLIED FOR OVER 25 YEARS. IN THE PROCESS, IT WILL ALSO
CLOUD EVERY TITLE THAT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED ACCORDING
TO THAT POLICY DURING SAID 25 YEAR PERIOD
Putting

aside

for the moment

the question

of why the Trial

Court and the Court of Appeals elected to tackle a question of first
impression

rather

than

deeds dated December

address

the

legal

effect

of the

warranty

30 and 31, 1969 - which transferred the land

and appurtenant water after the State Engineer's certificate issued
- there is the larger problem of the impact their decision will have
on

all

conveyances

made

under

said

State

instant action provides a good case study.

Engineer

policy.

The

12
Here, the State Engineer considered the deed of January 16,
1968 as constituting the root title for the subject water right (PI.
Ex. No. 6 ) .
submitted

On January 16f 1968 the owner of the water right had

proof

of

appropriation,

demonstrating

actual

and

beneficial use of the water, the drilling of the well, construction
of the diversion facilities, etc., but the State Engineer had not
issued his certificate of appropriation.

Under these circumstances

where there is a demonstrated actual and beneficial use of the water
the State Engineer has consistently transferred title to the water
before the certificate issues (Tr. 56).

Here, the only reason the

certificate did not issue was because the State Engineer was too
busy with other non-related pressing problems (Tr. 56) .

Thus, the

actual certificate did not issue until almost two years after the
proof of appropriation

was submitted.

But, the

State Engineer

nevertheless transferred title to the water right as an appurtenance
to

the

transfer

appropriation.

of

land

before

he

issued

the

certificate

of

The next deed in the title abstract maintained by

the Utah State Engineer on the subject water right is the warranty
deed dated December 31, 1969 whereby the five children, including
Lorna and Clara conveyed 41.3 acres to themselves and thus received
the water appurtenant thereto under statutory authority of §73-1-11
U.C.A. 1953 (PI. Ex. No. 6, Ex. D) .

Critically, the quit claim

deeds relied upon by the Appellees for their root title are nowhere
found in the State Engineer files maintained for this water right.
The Utah State Engineer

did

not consider Appellee's

root title

13
documents as constituting any part of the title to the water right.
Neither were they filed of record with the Kane County Recorder.
Moreover, the only testimony of the parties to the December 30 and
31,

1969

conveyances

was

to

the

effect

that

this

was

how

they

received their water - as an appurtenance to the transfer of land
(Cottam Tr. 127, 136; John Little Tr. 97, 100; and Larry Little Tr.
161).

Thus, it would be, and is, absolutely impossible to confirm

title to a water right if parties are, as here, unable to rely on
the

title

abstract

administrative
transfer

policies

title

Recorder's

maintained

to

Office

adopted

water;
as

by

the

required

the

by

the

deeds
by

Utah

State

Utah

State

maintained

(§73-1-10

Engineer;

by

Engineer

the
to

the

County

U.C.A. 1953);

or the

testimony of the parties to the transaction which is subsequently
called into question.
title

abstract

Here, it is clear that the State Engineer's

supports

Appellant's

and

not

Appellee's

chain

of

title - the two chains of title are mutually exclusive at this point
and the deeds of January 16f 1968 and December 30 and 31, 1969 are
in Appellant's and not in Appellee's chain of title.

Thus, there is

absolutely no way that a result such as that reached by the Trial
Court

and

Court

of

Appeals

will

not

make

title

abstracting

an

impossible proposition.
Ill
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT
In order
right,

a

to succeed

party

must

in an action to quiet title to a water

prevail

on

the

strength

of

his/her

claim.
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Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch, Inc., 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983).
Therefore,

it

is

incumbent

upon

Defendant/Appellees

to

clearly

articulate their chain of title - which they could not and did not
do in the courts below*

When they tried to set forth their chain of

title (Defendant's Brief, pages 25 through 27) critical dates were
omitted, intervening conveyances were not referenced, and fractional
ownership interests were not disclosed.
want to set forth their position.

Defendants simply did not

Moreover, they clearly changed

their position from the Trial Court to the Court of Appeals.

For

example, at trial Defendant's chain of title was short and simple.
Defendant's root title was comprised of two quit claim deeds, one
was undated and the other bore the date of November 17, 1969.

By

virtue of these two deeds - neither of which expressly referenced
the

subject

water

right

- Defendant's

claimed

their

immediate

predecessors in interest, Lorna and Clara Bess, obtained 100% of the
subject water right from their father Lester F. Little.

Thereafter,

Appellee Greene & Weed contended it received its title from Lorna
and Clara Bess when by assignment dated September 1, 1972 the two
sisters conveyed 100% of the water right to them (PTO IV(2); Tr.
192).

Contrary to Defendant's theory of title the Trial Court

expressly found that Greene & Weed obtained their title by virtue of
deeds - not assignment - from Lorna and Clara Bess and by quit claim
deed from East Canyon Irrigation Company (FF 20) .

Apparently, the

trial judge was relying on the deeds dated December 18, 1975 whereby
Lorna and Clara Bess, by separate deeds, expressly conveyed a 5/8ths
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interest in the disputed water right (Def. Ex. 15 and 15A) and on a
quit claim deed dated December 18, 1974 from East Canyon Irrigation
Company

(PI. Ex. 14; Def. Ex. D-7) .

inconsistent

with Defendant's

This finding

theory of title.

is absolutely

Thus, Defendants

clearly had to, and didf change their theory of title to accommodate
the Court's finding

- yet their theory still cannot be explained

because the 5/8ths interest Lorna and Clara Bess expressly conveyed
is consistent with what Lorna and Clara Bess received by deed dated
December 31, 1969.
Company

So too is the interest of East Canyon Irrigation

which traces

its

interest

back

to the December

30, 1969

conveyance (Tr. 97 f 100). Both fall squarely within Appellant's and
not Appellee's chain of title.
Significantly,

when

Defendant

did

set

forth

their

modified

chain of title on appeal they did not include all the conveyances
made

by

the

parties,
whole)

the
or,

ownership

conveyance.

They did not do this because it would make their theory

of Fact

and

of Law and

title

is

clear

and

testimony of the parties.

dates

of

that

of Defendant's

There is simply no theory of title which

will support Defendant's chain of title.
of

the

The inconsistency with the Trial Court's

Conclusions

theory of title are many.

circumstances

conveyed

or

Findings

some

being

(fractional

of title incomprehensible.

in

interests

consistent

and

However, Appellant's chain
in

accordance

with

the
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided a question of
first impression rather than the central and dispositive issue in
this case.

Water passed as an appurtenance to the conveyance of

land under statutory authority of §73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 on December
30 and 31r 1969, and the uncontradicted testimony of the parties to
those conveyances was that this was how they received their water
right.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant

respectfully requests that

this Court grants its Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted this ,2-Q^-day of September 1990.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

\

\^ ( L ^

John W. Anderson
Attorney for Appellant
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Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Garff.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Appellant appeals the trial court's decision awarding water
rights to the appellees.1 We affirm.
On January 16, 1968, Lester F. Little and Madge Little,
husband and wife, conveyed to their five children by warranty
deed 80.1 acres of land located in the Johnson Canyon area in
1. This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree which the
lower court certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 54(b). The lower court action was brought on two
counts: (1) a challenge to the state engineer's decision; and
(2) an action to quiet title to a water right. The issues below
were bifurcated. The quiet title action was tried first since
determination of the water right ownership will likely determine
the challenge to the state engineer's decision. The present
appeal concerns only the quiet title action.

Kanab, Utah. The deed conveyed to each an undivided one-fifth
interest "[t]ogether with all improvements and appurtenances
appertaining thereto." At the time of the conveyance the water
right later associated with the land had not yet been
certificated by the state engineer. This water right was carved
out of a larger water right application originally filed by
Lester on April 12, 1955 and approved by the state engineer on
October 15, 1958. On November 30, 1967, Lester filed the
application to segregate the water right in question. The new
application requested permission to appropriate .92 cubic feet
per second (cfs) out of the 10 cfs in the original application
for use on 83.3 acres. The state engineer opened a new file upon
receiving the segregated application.
Lester constructed diversion facilities and irrigated the
83.3 acres beginning in the early part of 1967. On December 19,
1967, Lester filed proof of appropriation with the state engineer
demonstrating that the diversion facilities were complete and
that the water had been placed to beneficial use. Approximately
one month after filing the proof of appropriation, but prior to
certification, Lester conveyed 80.1 of the 83.3 acres to his five
children.
The five children made several conveyances further dividing
the land. Appellant contends that the initial warranty deed from
Lester and Madge to the five children transferred the water right
as an appurtenance to the land. Therefore, the subsequent
warranty deeds issued by the children also passed the water
rights, and the quitclaim deeds and other documents relied upon
by appellees are irrelevant to the court's determination of title
to the water.
Appellees argue that the water rights were not conveyed in
the warranty deeds issued by Lester and Madge. Rather, they
argue that on November 17, 1969, Lester conveyed the entire water
right to Lorna and Clara, two of the five children, by quitclaim
deeds. They argue that water rights cannot be appurtenant to
land until after the state engineer issues a certificate of
appropriation. The trial court agreed and held that "[t]he water
right involved . . . did not pass as an appurtenance to land
conveyed before it was perfected by the issuance of a certificate
of appropriation by the State Engineer."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the trial court's ruling is a question of law
which we review for correctness. Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135,
1136 (Utah 1988); see Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286

(Utah 1980) ("[Q]uestions of legislative intent and statutory
application are matters of law, not of fact.")
Appellant argues here that the water right becomes
appurtenant upon the filing of the proof of appropriation.2 He
therefore contends that the water right automatically transferred
in the warranty deed. He relies specifically on Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-1-11 (1989) which states that "[a] right to the use of
water appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of such
land" unless expressly reserved by the grantor. He also relies
on Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1989), which states that final water
rights may be transferred by deed in substantially the same
manner as real estate, and upon Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-18 (1989),
which states that rights claimed under water right applications
may be transferred by instruments in writing prior to issuance of
a certificate of appropriation.
To determine if the water right here was appurtenant to the
land at the time of the initial conveyance, we must look to the
nature of the right created by statute. See Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989), reh'g denied (1990); Mosbv
Irrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 46, 354 P.2d 848, 852
(1960). In determining the nature of this right we rely upon the
plain language of the statutes in question and prior case law.
Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500. In this analysis, we note that the
right to use and appropriate water is created by statute. See
Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852; Utah Code Ann.
§§ 73-3-1 to -29 (1989). The statutory procedure "prescribes the
exclusive manner in which such a right can be initiated, the
conditions upon which such right can be acquired, and the
procedural requirements which must be complied with." Criddle,
11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852.
Section 73-1-11 provides that "water appurtenant to land
shall pass to the grantee of such land . . . ." The term
••appurtenant" is not defined by statute. The Utah Supreme Court
has stated, however, that "[a] water right, acguired bv
appropriation and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose in
connection with a given tract of land, is an appurtenance
thereto, and as such passes with the conveyance of the land,
unless expressly reserved from the grant." Thompson v. McKinney,
91 Utah 89, 98, 63 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1937) (emphasis added)
2. A proof of appropriation is the next to last step in the
statutory water appropriation process. Before a certificate of
appropriation is issued the applicant must first file the proof
of appropriation demonstrating that diversion facilities are
complete and that a stated quantity of water has been applied to
a beneficial use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-16 (1989).

(quoting Lensina v. Day & Hansen Sec, Co,, 67 Mont. 382, 215 P.
999, 1000 (1923)).
Two steps must be completed before water becomes appurtenant
to land. First, the water must be beneficially applied to a
specific tract of land. Thompson, 91 Utah at 97-98, 63 P.2d at
1061. Second, all the statutory steps for appropriation must be
completed. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989) (no water rights
may be appropriated without first following statutory
requirements); Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852;
Thompson, 91 Utah at 98, 63 P.2d at 1061 (appropriation plus
beneficial use equals appurtenant right); see also Eardley v.
Terrv, 94 Utah 367, 375, 77 P.2d 362, 365 (1938). The first step
is completed when the proof of appropriation is filed. The
second step, however, can only be satisfied when the entire
statutory process is complete. Prior to completion of the entire
appropriation process, the applicant only has an inchoate3
right to the use of the water. See Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46,
354 P.2d at 852.
When Lester transferred the 80.1 acres to his five children
on January 16, 1968, the final statutory requirement in the
appropriative process, the issuance of a certificate, had not
been accomplished. Even though Lester had previously completed
the diversion facilities, applied the water to beneficial use,
and filed the proof of appropriation, the water right could not
be appurtenant to the land. The appropriation process is
complete only after the certificate of appropriation is issued
and that certificate then becomes "prima facie evidence" of the
owner's water right. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989);4
3. The term "inchoate" means "[i]mperfect; partial; unfinished;
begun, but not completed . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 686
(5th ed. 1979).
4. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989) provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Upon it being made to appear to the
satisfaction of the state engineer that an
appropriation . . . has been perfected in
accordance with the application therefor,
and that the water appropriated . . . has
been put to a beneficial use, as required
by Section 73-3-16, he shall issue a
certificate . . . .
The certificate so
issued and filed shall be prima facie
evidence of the owner's right to the use
of the water in the quantity, for the
purpose, at the place, and during the time
specified therein, subject to prior rights.

Eardley, 94 Utah at 375, 77 P.2d at 365 (M[N]o final rights are
acquired until the proof . . . is made and a certificate has been
issued by the state engineer."); Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake
View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 81, 166 P. 309, 311 (1917)
(certificate is appropriator•s deed of title good against the
state and against everyone else who cannot show a superior
right).
We therefore conclude that the January 16, 1968 warranty
deed did not transfer the water as an appurtenance to the land.
The trial court properly found that the November 19, 1969
quitclaim deed did transfer the water right at a time when that
right was fully vested.5
X

Ttyb decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:
&t)

p(Sy fJ&?j£*Gi *£sp
ench, ijudge

^^,

ss,0 / /
SggnalW. Garff, Judge'//
/ /

5. In its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that
Lester and Madge intended to transfer the entire water right in
the November 17, 1969 quitclaim deed, even though that deed
contained an incorrect property description. The trial court's
decision was based in part on a subsequent undated quitclaim
deed and on other documents which revealed the grantors*
intent. We find no error in the trial court's ruling.
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Larry Little,

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 890177-CA

Greene & Weed Investments, Leon
S. Lippincott, Caroline
Lippincott, and Dee C. Hansen,
State Engineer of the State of
Utah,
Defendants and Appellees.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed August 29,
1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 5th day of September, 1990.
FOR THE COURT

Mary \y. Noonan, Clerk

